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Prudential Regulation and Bank Accounting
Abstract
This study focuses on how to design a mechanism to coordinate prudential
regulation with bank accounting. I study a setting in which a bank chooses
loan quality and makes asset substitution decisions. The social planner sets
regulatory leverages and the accounting regime (either fair value accounting or
historical cost accounting) for banks to report on loan performance. By the
standard of ex ante bank value, I ﬁnd that the historical cost regime dominates
the fair value regime for medium values of asset substitution risk and asset sub-
stitution constraint, for low values of asset speciﬁcity, fundamental risk of loans
and marginal cost of loan quality, and for high values of marginal beneﬁt of
loan quality and the liquidity beneﬁt of bank debtholders. For other values of
these parameters, fair value accounting dominates. This study contributes to
the theoretical debate on bank opacity by incorporating both the asset side and
the liability side of the balance sheet in designing a mechanism to coordinate
prudential regulation with bank accounting. The paper makes important pol-
icy implications such as cycle-contingent regulations, asset risk class-contingent
regulations and country-contingent accounting standards.
Keywords: regulatory leverage; historical cost accounting; fair value
accounting; regulatory coordination; cycle-contingent regulation; debt over-
hang; asset substitution.
1 INTRODUCTION
A discussion is under way on alternative accounting standards for banks, especially
ﬁnancial reporting opacity, in the context of prudential regulation of banks (Laux and
Leuz 2009). Prudential regulations are reformed constantly: witness Basel I\Basel
II\Basel III or the mandatory stress test under Dodd-Frank Act. The 2007-2009 ﬁ-
nancial crisis spawned vigorous debates on the role of regulations (Admati and Hellwig
2013, Gale 2010). Prudential regulation is accounting-based with prudential lever-
age ratios as the ratio of the bank's liabilities to assets. Therefore, coordination of
prudential regulation and bank accounting is necessary to enhance social welfare.
Some stress the importance of the asset side of bank balance sheets. For example,
Morgan (2002, p. 874) states that the opacity of banks exposes the entire ﬁnancial
system to bank runs, contagion, and other strains of systemic risk. Take away opacity
and the whole story unravels. Similarly, Nier and Bauman (2006, p. 337) believe
that a bank that discloses its risk proﬁle exposes itself to market discipline and
will therefore be penalized by investors for choosing higher risk. These views thus
argue for fair value accounting with its timely reports on interim performance of loan
portfolios, thereby enabling regulators to ﬁne-tune the target leverages to precisely
control the bank's asset substitution decisions. That is, fair value accounting makes
it feasible for the regulator to discipline bank's excessive risk taking, which may
eventually result in systemic risk.
Others emphasize the liability side, pointing to the role of banks in creating highly
liquid, money-like debt claims (e.g., demand deposits and the associated banking
services). Such claims are collateralized to make them information-insensitive. To
further make it, they argue, banks should be secret keepers, so governmental guar-
antees, regulation and supervision should not force banks to disclose information
(Dang et al. 2014; Holmstöm 2015). These views accordingly support historical cost
accounting, which does not report the interim performance of bank's loan portfolios
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on a timely basis, and so does not trigger interim insolvency risk and therefore safe-
guards debtholders' deposits and enhances their liquidity beneﬁt, which is deﬁned as
the convenience spread in the ﬁnance literature.1
I incorporate both the asset and the liability side of bank balance sheets to investi-
gate how the social planner coordinates prudential regulations with bank accounting
to enhance ex ante bank value (the sum of ex ante debt value and equity value).
How should the optimal regulatory leverage be set for a given accounting regime
(fair value accounting or historical cost accounting)? Under what conditions will one
regime dominate the other? I address these questions in a setting in which a rep-
resentative bank chooses its loan quality and makes its asset substitution decision,
and a social planner sets prudential leverage targets to maximize ex ante bank value,
which captures depositor's liquidity beneﬁt as well because investors take liquidity
beneﬁt into consideration when pricing on debts.
Banks are plagued by debt overhang, posing problems of both asset substitution
and underinvestment in loan quality. A bank may increase the risk of its loan portfolio
to gamble on the upside potential at the expense of the debtholders, and expected
value of loan portfolio can suﬀer as a result. For example, it may undertake projects
with negative net present value (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole
1993; Gron and Winton 2001; Admati and Hellwig 2013), construct derivatives for
speculation based on the loan portfolio, or reduce the frequency of ﬁled inspections
at borrowers' facility in hopes of achieving the upside potential. Banks with excessive
leverage may forgo positive net present value projects and thus under-invest in the
quality of the loan portfolio (Myers 1977; Admati et al. 2012).
I incorporate these two debt overhang problems in a two-period model character-
ized by maturity mismatch, a key characteristic of banking as such. The bank ﬁnances
its long-term lending (its largest asset item) using short-term deposits (its largest li-
1Subramanian and Yang (2018) document that on average liquidity beneﬁt per deposit dollar is
around 25% with a standard error of 0.08 for banks in the U.S. over the period 1991 to 2008.
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ability item). Speciﬁcally, it chooses the quality of the loan portfolio in period 1 and
makes its asset substitution decision in period 2. Asset substitution may enhance the
bank's equity value in period 2; Anticipating this, the bank is incentivized to choose
a higher quality loan portfolio in period 1. Put another way, if the bank's period 2
asset substitution is constrained, its period 1 incentive for quality will be dampened
(Lu, Sapra, and Subramanian 2019).
Apparently, the higher the bank's leverage, the greater incentive to engage in as-
set substitution. Thus, the social planner may naturally want to lower the regulatory
leverage target in period 2 in order to constrain asset substitution. But this reduces
the bank's incentives for quality as noted. To counteract this eﬀect, the social plan-
ner may lower leverage target in period 1 to reduce debt overhang with respect to
loan quality. In this case, the leverage targets in both periods are lowered and the
bank's debt capacity is accordingly reduced, which implies less liquidity beneﬁt for
the debtholders (Bryant 1980; Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Calomiris and Kahn 1991;
Gale 2010).
The model captures such economic tradeoﬀs, and more importantly, it also in-
troduces an accounting tradeoﬀ (fair value vs. historical cost). Under fair value
accounting, in which interim loan performance is reported, the social planner can
tie the interim prudential leverage to the fair value report and so precisely manage
bank's asset substitution (Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington 1993; Kahn and Win-
ton 2004; Allen, Carletti, ad Marquez 2011; Bulow, Goldﬁeld, and Klemperer 2013).
However, the interim fair value report brings an interim volatility into the market
value of the bank's debt and equity, entailing an interim insolvency risk. Under his-
torical cost accounting in which the loan performance is not reported on a timely
basis, the social planner cannot precisely manage asset substitution. However, at the
same time, the absence of timely fair value reports eliminates interim volatility in the
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market value of debt and equity, suppressing the interim insolvency risk. 2
The main elements in the model are (1) bank asset substitution and quality of loan
portfolio (the asset side of the bank balance sheet), (2) the bank debtholders' liquidity
beneﬁts (the liability side), (3) the regulatory leverage target (prudential regulation),
and (4) historical cost accounting or fair value accounting (bank accounting).
Bank value is deﬁned as the sum of debt plus equity value, so both assets and
liabilities are important for the bank's value. Therefore, my main results relate to
the conditions under which one accounting regime dominates the other in terms of
bank assets and liabilities parameters, using the ex ante bank value as the criterion.
The assets related parameters are: asset substitution risk, which captures the upside
potential for banks to choose asset substitution; asset substitution constraint, which
captures the cost of asset substition for banks; the asset speciﬁcity, which captures
the social loss in bankrutcy; fundamental risk of loan portfolio, which captures the
volatility of loan; marginal beneﬁts of loan quality; marginal cost of loan quality;
The liability related parameter is liquidity beneﬁt, which captures the non-pecuniary
beneﬁts to depositors and will be priced into debt value.
Given the economic tradeoﬀs and accounting tradeoﬀs described above, I ﬁnd that
historical cost accounting dominates fair value accounting for the following parameter
values of bank assets: medium values of asset substitution risk; medium values of asset
substitution constraint; low values of asset speciﬁcity; high values of marginal beneﬁt
or low values of marginal cost of loan quality; low values of fundamental risk of the
loan portfolio. Historical cost also dominates fair value for the liabilities parameter:
high values of the liquidity beneﬁts of bank debtholders. For other parameter values,
fair value dominates historical cost.
2This paper studies two pure forms of accounting regime for bank loans representing the major
bank's assets, fair value accounting and historical cost accounting. The fair value of a bank loan
is level 3 fair value, determined by the bank's private information. Therefore, under historical cost
accounting, as private information about loans is not incorporated into loan interim fair value, the
accounting report on bank loans is less informative than that under fair value accounting. Because
I study accounting standard setting, I do not consider any managerial discretion in this model.
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My investigation contributes to the public policy debate on prudential regulation
and bank accounting.
(1) The social planner may condition regulatory leverages and accounting choice
on the asset substitution risk classes of bank loans and/or the strength of bank's cor-
porate governance. For bank loans with extremely low or extremely high asset substi-
tution risk, fair value accounting is preferable, because fair value accounting makes it
feasible for social planners to precisely curb extremely low or allow extremely high as-
set substituion risk by setting high regulatory leverages, which may enhance liquidity
beneﬁts and bank value as results; and for those with mid-level risk, historical cost
accounting is better, because the low leverage to precisely curb or allow asset substi-
tion will damage liquidity beneﬁts, while loan quality is suppressed or not incentived
to the high extent due to the medium asset substittution incentives. To the extent
that the asset substitution risk varies over the phases of business and credit cycles,
my result suggests cycle-contingent regulation, if practical. Speciﬁcally, insofar as the
asset substitution risk is high at peak, low in trough and medium in contraction or
expansion, it is optimal to apply fair value accounting at cyclical peaks and troughs
and historical cost accounting during the upswings and downswings. The results also
suggest corporate governance contingent regulation, if practical. Speciﬁcally, to the
extent that the asset substitution constraint is severe for banks with good or bad cor-
porate governance and less severe for those with mid-quality corporate governance, it
is optimal to apply fair value accounting for the former and historical cost accounting
for the latter.
(2) Fair value accounting is optimal for bank assets with high speciﬁcity or high
illiquidity, because the high social loss due to high speciﬁcity or high illiquidity may
make the ﬁne-tuning leverage to precisely manage bank's asset substitution to enhance
bank value less attractive under fair value accounting, which may also brings interim
insolvency to damage bank value; Historical cost accounting is for generic or liquid
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assets. Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008) generate an opposite result in a setting of
premature asset sales triggered by higher-order beliefs. Accordingly, I identify another
rationale relating to the desirability of either historical cost accounting or fair value
accounting in terms of speciﬁcity of bank assets.
(3) One of my results sheds light on impairment accounting (or lower-of-cost-
or-market rule). To the extent that the marginal beneﬁt (cost) of loan quality is
high (low) in good times and the opposite in bad times, it is socially optimal to
mandate historical cost accounting in good times and fair value accounting in bad
times. This is what impairment accounting prescribes. Therefore, I add the beneﬁt
of impairment accounting to the existing literature by exploring the way in which
impairment accounting is beneﬁcial to lenders (banks), while the existing literature
(Göx and Wagenhofer 2009; Li 2017) identiﬁes the beneﬁts of impairment accounting
to borrowers.
(4) Another result relates to liquidity beneﬁts to bank depositors. To the ex-
tent that depositors in developing countries value liquidity beneﬁts relatively more
than those in developed countries, my result implies that historical cost accounting
is better for developing countries and fair value accounting is better for developed
countries. This should warn developing countries against their rush to adapt their
local accounting standards to the International Financial Reporting Standards, which
are moving rapidly towards fair value accounting.
Overall, my study identiﬁes the characteristics of bank assets and liabilities to take
into account in designing prudential regulation and bank accounting. I also provide
speciﬁc examples of how the two regulations should be optimally coordinated.
The study contributes to the theoretical literature on bank accounting. (1) It
incorporates both the asset side and the liability side of bank's balance sheets in
the discussion on bank opacity. (2) It focuses on regulatory coordination: How are
prudential regulation and bank accounting optimally coordinated?
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Li (2017) and Bertomeu, Mahieux, and Sapra (2018) also study the coordination
of prudential regulation and bank accounting but with a diﬀerent focus. Li (2017)
introduces capital issuance decisions whereas Bertomeu, Mahieux, and Sapra (2018)
introduce accounting information system design, and both papers study the loan risk
decisions. By contrast, I introduce the loan quality decision, which aﬀects both the
mean and the variance of loan fundamentals.
Several papers have examined prudential regulation under fair value accounting
only, ignoring historical cost accounting. Heaton, Lucas, and McDonald (2010) in-
vestigates the design of capital requirements under mark-to-market. Lu, Sapra, and
Subramanian (2019) study a setting in which the bank can misreport its performance
under fair value accounting. The present paper, instead, extends and modiﬁes their
model, studying historical cost accounting as well, and thus provides a fuller picture
of the optimal accounting choices for banks under diﬀerent conditions.
Most previous accounting studies do not endogenize prudential regulation. Allen
and Carletti (2008) focuses on historical cost versus fair value accounting as well
but they are interested in contagion from the insurance sector to the banking sector.
Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008) also considers historical cost versus fair value account-
ing for banks, focusing on bank's asset sales decisions. Burkhardt and Strausz (2009)
analyze historical cost versus impairment accounting on asset substitution. I factor
in the bank's quality decision as well as the asset substitution decision, allowing for
the tradeoﬀ between them. Corona, Nan, and Zhang (2018) exmaine historical cost
versus fair value accounting for assets in place, focusing on bank's lending decisions
as opposed to asset substitution and quality decisions, which are the key ingredients
of the present study. In addition, they investigate the bank's voluntary choice of
accounting regimes whereas in my model the regime is mandatory. Finally, Bleck and
Gao (2018) compare the two accounting regimes and study the loan selling decision
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assuming the prudential regulation (capital requirement) is exogenous.3
My paper oﬀers some empirical predictions. For example, it indicates where
the cycle-contingent or asset risk-class contingent regulations, corporate governance-
contingent regulations, asset speciﬁcity-contingent accounting methods, loan quality-
contingent accounting methods or country contingent accounting methods are more
suitable. By developing proper proxies for the parameters in my model, future em-
pirical research can test my theoretical results.
Section 2 describes the model setup, sections 3 and 4 analyze the historical cost
regime and the fair value regime, and section 5 compares the two. The proofs of the
Propositions are given in the Appendix. Section 6 summarizes and discusses potential
research extensions.
3Some papers focus on attributes of accounting other than historical cost versus fair value ac-
counting. For example, Corona, Nan, and Zhang (2015) focus on accounting quality.
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2 THE MODEL
I model a setting in which (i) a representative bank chooses the quality (q) of its loan
portfolio in period 1 and makes its asset substitution decision (a) in period 2; (ii) a
social planner chooses regulatory leverage targets (equivalently, capital requirements)
for period 1 (L1) and period 2 (L2)
4 and an accounting regime (fair value accounting
or historical cost accounting). This is a modiﬁed extended model in Lu, Sapra, and
Subramanian (2019).
2.1 The Loan Portfolio
At date 0, the bank originates a loan portfolio whose terminal cash ﬂow V will
be realized at date 2, V = XZ. Two decisions by the bank aﬀect V : a date 0
quality decision q ∈ {qH , qL} which aﬀects X, and a date 1 asset substitution decision
a ∈ {0, 1}, which aﬀects Z.
At date 0, the bank can engage in costly loan screening to ﬁlter loan applications.
The cost of quality is C(q) where C(q) = c if q = qH and C(q) = 0 if q = qL. The
higher quality, qH , generates better interim loan performance X and thus greater net
present value. Speciﬁcally, X ∼ Lognormal(q, σ2X) with density g(X) and cumula-
tive distribution function G(X). Equivalently, X = eq+σXε where ε ∼ N(0, 1). σX
captures the fundamental risk of the loan portfolio, i.e. the volatility of the loan fun-
damental. For example, ﬁnancing a ﬁrm's R&D project is riskier than loans for other
projects. I assume (eqH − eqL) e 12σ2X > c , which implies that the marginal beneﬁt of
the higher quality qH relative to qL exceeds the marginal cost, so the ﬁrst-best loan
quality is qH to maximize the expected net return from loan quality screening. Natu-
rally, the higher quality qH increases both the mean and the variance of X, capturing
4This is not a dynamic model to deal with multiple-period leverage, but instead, proposes a
leverage bundle as the socially optimal choice. The two leverages in my model represent the prices
for deposits in two periods. Practically, regulators do in fact apply diﬀerent capital requirements
under diﬀerent economic conditions when needed, for example in recession.
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the idea that higher expected return comes with higher volatility.
At date 1, after privately learning the realized value of the interim loan perfor-
mance X, the bank can engage in asset substitution, as by reducing the frequency
of inspections at borrower's facilities or increasing the riskiness of the loan portfolio
using derivatives. Speciﬁcally, Z ∼ Lognormal(−ak, a2σ2Z) with density f(Z) and cu-
mulative distribution function F (Z). Equivalently, Z = ea(σZη−k) where η ∼ N(0, 1).
σZ captures the asset substitution risk, i.e, the attractiveness of the asset substitution
or the opportunity of asset substitution for banks. For example, in cyclical peaks,
the availability of derivatives for speculation is greater than in troughs, hence σZ
is relatively higher in peaks. k captures the constraint on asset substitution: the
frequency of stress testing, say, or the relative soundness of corporate governance.
I assume k > 1
2
σ2Z , which implies that asset substitution is very costly. Naturally,
asset substitution decreases the mean of Z and increases its variance and skewness,
implying that on average asset substitution is value-destroying.
2.2 Prudential Regulation and Bank Accounting
Banking industry has one essential characteristic feature, namely maturity mismatch-
ing. That is, banks normally issue short-term deposit liabilities to ﬁnance long-term
loan assets. On the asset side of the balance sheet, because banks are highly leveraged,
they are plagued with asset substitution and underinvestment in loan quality. Specif-
ically, because of high leverage, banks have an incentive to use depositors' money to
gamble on the upside potential, aggravating the asset substitution problem, which
may damage loan NPV. In addition, the bulk of potential proﬁts from loan origina-
tion will accrue to depositors, but the cost of loan screening is borne by shareholders.
Therefore, banks are discouraged from engaging in costly loan quality investment,
again to the detriment of loan NPV. On the liability side, banks' role of providing
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liquidity to depositors is crucial to social welfare. The higher leverage, the more
deposits will be issued, and the greater the liquidity beneﬁts will be. Hence, bank
insolvency risk jeopardizes liquidity beneﬁts, hence deposits.5 Due to their lack of
bargaining power, individual depositors cannot contract directly with banks to disci-
pline the latter's risk taking, which bears on insolvency risk. The regulator steps in to
represent individual depositors and discipline risk taking, and banking is accordingly
characterized by strict regulation, such as capital requirements and stress testing.
Because neither asset substitution nor quality choice is veriﬁable, the present model
focuses on the leverage ratio, which is invoked by prudential regulation and is well
identiﬁed in the literature as the root of the problem of asset substitution and loan
quality incentives.
Because the bank chooses its loan quality in period 1 and makes its asset substi-
tution decision in period 2, the social planner ideally sets a prudential leverage level
bundle for each period, {L1, L2}. Moreover, given maturity mismatching, the volume
of the deposits (or the deposits' price) may diﬀer between period 1 and 2.6 This
further enhances the desirability of time-varying leverage ratios as opposed to ﬁxed.
Because prudential leverage ratios are based on bank balance-sheet data, bank ac-
counting plays a critical role in regulations. The debate on historical cost accounting
versus fair value accounting is a case in point. Speciﬁcally, at date 1, fair value ac-
counting mandates interim loan performance reports; That is, disclosure of the bank's
private information on the realized value of X.7 Thus, the social planner can tie pe-
riod 2 prudential leverage L2 to the accounting report X. Historical cost accounting
5The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guarantees only a portion of deposits. My setup is
relevant as long as the depositors' loss exceeds this limit, which is especially acute in ﬁnancial crises
in which systemic risk threatens the whole banking sector.
6My assumption of short-term deposits serves purely to highlight the maturity mismatch between
assets and liabilities. All my results hold with a mixture of long-term and short-term deposits.
7Because of the long-term nature of loans, realized value of X at date 1 is the bank's private
information, and not cash ﬂow. The cash ﬂow is not X but V = XZ, which will be realized at date
2. In addition, because the realized value of X is hidden information, the fair value report of X is
a Level 3 input in the fair value hierarchy.
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by contrast, does not mandate a report of X at date 1, so the prudential leverage level
for period 2 cannot be tied to interim performance. In short, fair value accounting
provides more information than historical cost accounting.8 However, owing to the
multiple frictions in the economy, the interactions of asset substitution, underinvest-
ment, and liquidity beneﬁt provisions, the more, the merrier is not always apt as
shown in later sections.9
2.3 Timeline
Given the social planner's choices of prudential regulation {L1, L2} and bank account-
ing (historical cost or fair value), the game plays out as follows:
Date 0 :
(i) The bank ﬁnances the initial investment I via short term debt, D0, and equity,
E0. The debt matures at date 1 with maturity value L1.
(ii) The bank chooses the loan quality, q ∈ {qH , qL}, and incurs quality cost C(q).
Date 1 :
(i) The interim loan performance X is realized and is known privately to the bank.
It is disclosed under fair value accounting but not under historical cost accounting.
(ii) Denote the market values of the bank's debt and equity at date 1 before L1 is paid
as D1 and E1, respectively. If the bank is insolvent, i.e., D1 +E1 < L1, the bank goes
bankrupt and the liquidation value of the loan portfolio is normalized to 0 because
8The diﬀerence between two regimes is that fair value accounting reports interim loan performance
on a timely basis while historical cost accounting does not. Both regimes report the loan origination
value at date 0 and realized value at date 2.
9To focus on quality choice and asset substitution decisions, I take the bank's scale of lending as
given, that is, I assume a ﬁxed amount of investment I in place at the beginning of the game. The
literature has investigated the scale of investment thoroughly (e.g., Corona, Nan, and Zhang (2018)).
As a consequence, I cannot deal with hybrid accounting regimes in this model. For example, impair-
ment accounting mandates the disclosure of min{I,X} at date 1. To make it interesting enough,
my model must endogenize I before addressing the merits and demerits of impairment accounting.
However, Proposition 9 in Section 5 does imply the desirability of impairment accounting, which is
also summarized in the Introduction.
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the pre-mature project is low-valued. If the bank is solvent, i.e., D1 + E1 ≥ L1, the
bank makes the required debt payment L1 by issuing new debt and (if necessary)
equity.10 The debt issued at date 1 matures at date 2 with maturity value L2.
(iii) The bank makes its asset substitution decision a ∈ {0, 1}.
Date 2 :
(i) The terminal cash ﬂow of the bank's loan portfolio is realized as V = XZ.
(ii) If the bank is insolvent, i.e., V < L2, it goes bankrupt and the liquidation value
of the loan portfolio is αV where α ∈ (0, 1); Thus 1 − α represents asset speciﬁcity,
causing deadweight loss in liquidation. If the bank is solvent, i.e., V ≥ L2, the bank
makes the required debt payment L2.
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2.4 Payoﬀs
At date 0, depositors lend D0 to the bank, and shareholders receive it and incur
the cost of quality investment C(q), so the net proceeds received will be: D0 −C(q).
Because depositors value the liquidity beneﬁts, their payoﬀs consist not only of
the pecuniary amount (cash ﬂow from the bank) but also a non-pecuniary beneﬁt,
the liquidity beneﬁts or convenience spread in ﬁnance literature. Hence, at date 1, if
the bank is solvent (D1+E1 ≥ L1), the depositors' period 1 payoﬀ is L1(1+λ), where
λ represents the liquidity beneﬁt per dollar deposited. In period 2 depositors lend D1
to the bank. Thus, bank shareholders' payoﬀ is D1 − L1. If the bank is insolvent,
both depositors and shareholders receive nothing.
10If the amount of new debt exceeds the required payment of the old debt, i.e, if D1 > L1, the
bank is assumed to use the surplus as new equity. For example, the bank may issue restricted stock
whose vesting date is date 2. The reason for this assumption is to make things easy. In practice, the
bank could pay dividends with the extra money. However, this would decrease equity. Therefore,
the equity value at date 1 will have to deduct the dividend paid, which is a constant. Deducting a
constant does not change the essence of the story. Therefore, I normalize the dividend paid to 0 for
ease of calculation.
11If loans are prematurely liquidated at date 1, their liquidation value is much lower than at
maturity (date 2). To capture this diﬀerence, I normalize the date 1 liquidate value to 0 and assume
a positive liquidation value αV at date 2.
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At date 2, if the bank is solvent (V ≥ L2), depositors' payoﬀ is L2(1 + λ). Thus,
the shareholders' payoﬀ is V − L2. If the bank is insolvent, depositors' payoﬀ is
αV (1 + λ) 12and shareholders receive nothing. I assume that α(1 + λ) < 1 to avoid
the unrealistic scenario in which liquidation at date 2 generates a greater social value
(αV (1 + λ) ) than the cash ﬂow without deadweight loss (V ).
2.5 Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
I focus on the bank's loan quality choice q ∈ {qH , qL} at date 0 and its asset
substitution decision a ∈ {0, 1}at date 1. I assume that the social planner's objective
is to maximize bank's value at the date 0, that is, pi0 ≡ D0 + E0, the sum of the
date 0 debt value and equity value while the bank's objective is to maximize equity
at all dates. Given these objectives, I investigate the social planner's optimal choices
of prudential leverage for periods 1 and 2, {L1, L2}, under a given accounting regime,
either historical cost accounting or fair value accounting, to induce the bank's decision
on loan quality and asset substitution. I will identify the conditions under which one
accounting regime dominates the other. Eventually, I will show how to design the
optimal mechanisms for coordinating prudential regulation with bank accounting to
enhance bank value.
In my model, several parameters in economic environments will shed light on the
optimal coordination of prudential regulation and bank accounting. On the asset
side, I am interested in two sets of parameters in particular:
(i) those that aﬀect the bank's quality decision: σX (fundamental risk of the loan
portfolio); qH relative to qL (the incremental beneﬁt of loan quality); and c (the
incremental cost of loan quality).
(ii) those that aﬀect the bank's asset substitution decision: σZ (asset substitution
12If the bank is insolvent at date 2, the loan portfolio assets will be forece to go into liquidation
procedure. After paying liquidation fee, such as attoneys' fee, the remaining value of loans will be
accrued to bank's debtholders, depositors. For every dollar of receipts, depositors value the related
liquidity beneﬁt λ. Because of liquidity beneﬁt, one of the components of social value, social planner
will have to consider the eﬀect of deadweight loss on optimal regulation.
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risk); k (asset substitution constraint); and 1 − α (the deadweight loss from date 2
insolvency due to asset speciﬁcity).
On the liability side, I am interested in parameter λ (liquidity beneﬁt to deposi-
tors).
16
3 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION UNDER HISTORICAL COST AC-
COUNTING
Under historical cost accounting, interim loan performance X is not publicly dis-
closed at date 1. However, the bank knows X. At date 1, the bank chooses its
asset substitution decision to maximize its expected payoﬀ at date 2, given its private
knowledge of X:
max
a
E [1V≥L2 • (V − L2)|X] , (1)
where the bank will be solvent when its date 2 bank value V exceeds its date 2
obligation L2, and 1V≥L2 is an indicator function equal to 1 if V ≥ L2 and 0 otherwise.
The following proposition conﬁrms the conventional wisdom that high leverage
leads to asset substitution.
Proposition 1. (a) At date 1, the bank chooses asset substitution (a = 1) over no
asset substitution (a = 0) if and only if leverage is high enough (L2 > γ0X).
(b) At date 1, date 2 insolvency risk is F
(
L2
X
)
.
In the foregoing, γ0 is deﬁned by
1− γ0 =
∞ˆ
γ0
(Z − γ0) f(Z)dZ. (2)
At date 1, market values of equity and debt are, respectively,
E1 = E [1V≥L2 • (V − L2)]
D1 = E [1V≥L2 • L2(1 + λ) + 1V <L2 • αV (1 + λ)]
, (3)
where the debtholders receive the maturity value of debt L2 plus liquidity beneﬁt λL2
when the bank is solvent at date 2. When it is insolvent they receive the liquidation
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value of loans αV plus liquidity beneﬁt λαV .
If the interim loan performance X were publicly known, the capital market would
know precisely whether the bank will engage in asset substitution or not: Asset
substitution takes place if and only ifX < L2
γ0
(Proposition 1(a)). IfX were known, the
market value of the bank (the sum of equity and debt market values) can be denoted
as XB0
(
L2
X
)
given no asset substitution and XB1
(
L2
X
)
given asset substitution, where
B0
(
L2
X
) ≡ 1 + L2
X
λ
B1
(
L2
X
) ≡ ´∞L2
X
(
Z + L2
X
λ
)
f(Z)dZ +
´ L2
X
0
αZ(1 + λ)f(Z)dZ
. (4)
However, under historical cost accounting, the interim loan performance X is not
disclosed. Therefore, the market must assess the distribution of X, and the date 1
market value of the bank (debt plus equity market values) before the payment of L1
to the period 1 depositors thus becomes:
pi1(q, L2) ≡
∞ˆ
L2
γ0
XB0
(
L2
X
)
g(X; q)dX +
L2
γ0ˆ
0
XB1
(
L2
X
)
g(X; q)dX. (5)
At date 0, the bank chooses loan quality to maximize its equity value:
E0 ≡ max
q
− C(q) + E [1pi1(q,L2)≥L1 • (pi1 − L1)] , (6)
where the bank will be solvent when date 1 bank value pi1 exceeds its date 1 obligation
L1.
Analogously, the date 0 market values of debt is
D0 = E
[
1pi1(q,L2)≥L1 • L1(1 + λ)
]
, (7)
where the debtholders receive the maturity value of debt L1 plus liquidity beneﬁt λL1
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when the bank is solvent at date 1.
The following proposition conﬁrms the conventional wisdom that debt overhang
leads to underinvestment in loan quality.
Proposition 2. [historical cost accounting] (a) At date 0, the bank chooses the low
quality (qL) if and only if the leverage is high enough (L1 > pi1(qH , L2)− c).
(b) The bank will be insolvent at date 1 if and only if L1 > pi1(q, L2).
Propositions 1 and 2 highlight the frictions plaguing in the banking industry,
debt overhang problems (asset substitution and loan quality underinvestment) and
insolvency problems due to high leverage.
Friction 1: High prudential leverage in period 2 L2 produces bank's asset substi-
tution incentives and high insolvency risk. With high L2, the bank has an eﬀective
call option, that is, it can reap the entire upside potential and ignore downside risk.
Thus, the bank has an incentive to use depositors' money to gamble, or engage in
asset substitution. This is demonstrated by Proposition 1(a): The bank chooses asset
substitution (a = 1) over no asset substitution if and only if leverage is high enough
(L2 > γ0X). In addition, while high leverage may generate a large liquidity beneﬁt
for depositors, it may also engender high insolvency risk at date 2, which jeopardizes
liquidity beneﬁt. If the bank goes bankrupt, the promised cash ﬂow to depositors
and the liquidity beneﬁt will be curtailed. This is demonstrated by Proposition 1(b):
The insolvency risk at date 2 (F
(
L2
X
)
) is high with a high leverage L2.
Friction 2: High prudential leverage in period 1 L1 gives the bank an incentive to
underinvest in quality and thus generates high insolvency risk. With high L1, the bulk
of the future beneﬁt from quality investment accrues to debtholders. Thus, the bank
is discouraged from a costly quality investment. This is demonstrated by Proposition
2(a): The bank chooses low quality (qL) over high quality if and only if leverage is
high enough (L1 > pi1(qH , L2)− c). Moreover, while high leverage may generate high
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liquidity beneﬁt for depositors, it may also produce high insolvency risk at date 1,
jeopardizing the possibility of realizing the liquidity beneﬁt. This is demonstrated by
Proposition 2(b): The bank will be insolvent if and only if L1 > pi1(q, L2).
Given the foregoing trade-oﬀs embedded in the bank's private incentives, a social
planner sets {L1, L2} to maximize the bank value at date 0 pi0 ≡ D0 + E0, the sum
of the debt value and equity value, as depicted in proposition 3.
Proposition 3. [historical cost accounting] The social planner sets the optimal lever-
ages {LHC1 , LHC2 } as follows:
(a) LHC1 = pi1(qH , L
HC
2 )− c and LHC2 is characterized by
´∞
LHC2
γ0
B
′
0
(
LHC2
X
)
g(X; qH)dX +
´ LHC2
γ0
0 B
′
1
(
LHC2
X
)
g(X; qH)dX = 0, (8)
which induces the equilibrium bank decisions:
(b) Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
;
(c) qHC = qH ;
and the equilibrium date 0 bank value:
(d) piHC0 = [pi1(qH , L
HC
2 )− c](1 + λ).
The social planner sets the prudential leverage in period 2 L2 to balance the trade-
oﬀs in Friction 1 above. High period 2 leverage directly generates higher liquidity
beneﬁt, but also increases date 2 insolvency risk, thereby jeopardizing the possibility
of realizing the liquidity beneﬁt. In addition, higher leverage induces higher proba-
bility of asset substitution, decreasing bank value at date 1. The balance between
these forces yields the optimal choice of L2 (equation (8)), which in turn determines
the asset substitution target set by the social planner (Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
).
The social planner also sets period 1 prudential leverage L1 to balance the trade-
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oﬀs described in Friction 2 above. High period 1 leverage directly generates higher
liquidity beneﬁt, but also increases insolvency risk at date 1, jeopardizing the possi-
bility of realizing the liquidity beneﬁt. In addition, higher leverage discourages the
bank from choosing high quality. The balance between these forces yields the optimal
choice of L1, which in turn induces the bank to choose high quality (q
HC = qH).
Because the social planner sets the prudential regulation leverage bundle {L1, L2}
for the two periods at the same time at date 0, they are naturally optimally combined.
Speciﬁcally, the social planner sets L2 to maximize the bank value at date 1 pi1 before
the payment of L1 to period 1 depositors. Because higher bank value at date 1
encourages quality investment, debt overhang problem in period 1 is mitigated, and
the social planner can increase L1 to enhance liquidity beneﬁt in period 1 to the fullest
extent, constrained only by the requirement that no interim insolvency is triggered.13
13Under historical cost accounting, X is not disclosed, so the social planner cannot precisely
induce the socially desirable choice of asset substitution, but rather an optimal incidence of asset
substitution. In this regard, regulation is less eﬃcient than second-best regulation under fair value
accounting. With this less eﬃcient regulation on asset substitution, a social planner has to make
sure that high quality is ﬁrst induced to enhance ex-ante bank value. This is why high quality is
always induced under historical cost accounting.
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4 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION UNDER FAIR VALUE ACCOUNT-
ING
The bank's asset substitution decision at date 1 is based on its knowledge of the
interim loan performance X and the prevailing prudential leverage for period 2 L2.
Therefore, the bank will engage in asset substitution at date 1 if and only if L2
X
> γ0,
as in Proposition 1.
Under fair value accounting, X is disclosed at date 1, so the social planner can
tie L2 to X and set
L2
X
= γ so as to induce no asset substitution (a = 0) by setting
γ ≤ γ0 or asset substitution (a = 1) by setting γ > γ0. Then, the market value of
the bank at date 1 is pi1 = XBa(γ) where pi1 = XB0(γ) with no asset substitution
(a = 0) and pi1 = XB1(γ) with asset substitution (a = 1). Note that because the
interim loan performance X is disclosed at date 1, the market value of the bank at
this date is diﬀerent from its counterpart (5) under historical cost accounting, which
integrates over the possible values of X.
At date 1, the bank will be solvent if and only if its date 1 value pi1 exceeds its
date 1 obligation L1, or equivalently, X ≥ L1Ba(γ) . At date 0, the bank chooses quality
q to maximize its expected equity value at date 0:
E0 ≡ max
q
− C(q) +
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
[XBa(γ)− L1] g(X; q)dX, (9)
and the date 0 debt value is
D0 =
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
L1(1 + λ)g(X; q)dX, (10)
where the debtholders receive the maturity value of debt L1 plus liquidity beneﬁt λL1
when the bank is solvent at date 1. The following proposition 4 describes the decision
rule for the loan quality under fair value accounting.
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Proposition 4. [fair value accounting] (a) At date 0, the bank chooses low quality
(qL) if and only if leverage is high enough (L1 > L1(γ)).
(b) At date 0, the date 1 insolvency risk is G
(
L1
Ba(γ)
)
.
In the foregoing, L1(γ) is characterized by
ˆ ∞
L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
[
X − L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
]
g(X; qH)dX −
ˆ ∞
L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
[
X − L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
]
g(X; qL)dX =
c
Ba(γ)
. (11)
Proposition 4, along with Proposition 1, highlights the frictions plaguing in my
model, namely debt overhang problems (asset substitution and underinvestment in
loan quality) and insolvency problems due to high leverage. The ﬁrst two frictions
are similar to Friction 1 and Friction 2 under historical cost accounting, but the third
is unique to the fair value accounting regime.
Friction 3: Eliminating asset substitution may decrease the bank's incentive to
choose high quality. Speciﬁcally, when asset substitution yields a higher interim (date
1) bank value under some conditions, then eliminating it will decrease equityholders'
date 0 expected future payoﬀ, undermining the incentive to choose high quality. This
friction was ﬁrst identiﬁed in Lu, Sapra, and Subramanian (2019). It represents the
interaction between asset substitution and loan quality and may accordingly aﬀect
social planner's mechanism design.
Given the above trade-oﬀs embedded in the bank's private incentives, a social
planner sets {L1, L2} to maximize bank value at date 0 pi0 ≡ D0 + E0, the sum of
debt value and equity value. Proposition 5 describes social planner's optimal choice
of leverages to induce the socially desirable bank's decisions on asset substitution and
loan quality.
Proposition 5. [fair value accounting] The social planner sets the optimal leverages
{LFV1 , LFV2 } as follows:
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(i) If
A
(
L1(γa)
Ba(γa)
, qH
)
− A (eqL+S, qL) ≥ c
Ba(γa)
, (12)
LFV1 = L1(γa) and L
FV
2 = γ0X if B0(γ0) ≥ B1(γ1) and LFV2 = γ1X if B1(γ1) >
B0(γ0),
which induces the equilibrium bank decisions:
qFV = qH ;
aFV = 0 if B0(γ0) ≥ B1(γ1) and aFV = 1 if B1(γ1) > B0(γ0);
the equilibrium date 0 bank value piFV0 = Ba(γa)A
(
L1(γa)
Ba(γa)
, qH
)
− c.
(ii) If A
(
L1(γa)
Ba(γa)
, qH
)
− A (eqL+S, qL) < cBa(γa) ,
LFV1 = e
qL+SBa(γa) and L
FV
2 = γ0X if B0(γ0) ≥ B1(γ1) and LFV2 = γ1X if
B1(γ1) > B0(γ0),
which induces the equilibrium bank decisions:
qFV = qL;
aFV = 0 if B0(γ0) ≥ B1(γ1) and aFV = 1 if B1(γ1) > B0(γ0);
the equilibrium date 0 bank value piFV0 = Ba(γa)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
.
In the above, A
(
L1
Ba(γ)
, q
)
≡ ´∞L1
Ba(γ)
[
X + L1
Ba(γ)
λ
]
g(X; q)dX
and Ba(γa) = max{B0(γ0), B1(γ1)}, where
B0 (γ0) ≡ 1 + γ0λ
B1 (γ1) ≡
´∞
γ1
(Z + γ1λ) f(Z)dZ +
´ γ1
0
αZ(1 + λ)f(Z)dZ
, (13)
and
γ1 ≡ eT−k, (14)
where T is deﬁned by h(T/σZ)/σZ =
λ
(1+λ)(1−α) and S is deﬁned by h(S/σX)/σX =
λ
1+λ
, in which h() is a hazard rate function for a standard normal distribution.
Under fair value accounting, to balance the trade-oﬀs in Friction 1, the social
planner can tie period 2 prudential leverage L2 to interim loan performance X, and
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so precisely induce either asset substitution or no asset substitution, whichever yields
the greater interim bank value at date 1. Speciﬁcally, to inhibit asset substitution,
the social planner will set LFV2 = γ0X. To induce asset substitution, instead, leverage
greater than γ0 is set. The greater period 2 leverage directly generates greater liquid-
ity beneﬁt, but also increases date 2 insolvency risk, jeopardizing the possibility of
realizing the liquidity beneﬁt. The balance between liquidity beneﬁts and insolvency
risk yields the optimal L2 = γ1X.
The social planner also sets period 1 prudential leverage L1 to balance the trade-
oﬀs in Friction 2. Higher leverage in period 1 directly generates greater liquidity
beneﬁt, but also increases date 1 insolvency risk, jeopardizing the possibility of re-
alizing the liquidity beneﬁt as such. Further, higher leverage discourages the bank
from choosing high quality, while the asset substitution induced may be an indirect
incentive for higher loan quality. The balance of these forces yields the optimal L1,
which in turn induces an insolvency risk target at date 1 G
(
LFV1
Ba(γ)
)
.
Remark 1. Contrasts between Historical Cost Accounting and Fair Value Accounting.
(i) Under fair value accounting, the interim loan performance X is disclosed at
date 1, so the period 2 prudential leverage L2 can be tied to X, precisely inducing
either asset substitution or no asset substitution as desired. That is to say, fair value
accounting makes it feasible to ﬁne-tune prudential leverage L2 to achieve the most
eﬃcient regulation solution.
Under historical cost accounting instead, X is not reported at date 1, so the
planner only sets L2 to induce a target incidence of asset substitution, which balances
the trade-oﬀs described in Friction 1. This is relatively less eﬃcient than that under
fair value accounting.
(ii) Under historical cost accounting, the interim loan performance X is not dis-
closed at date 1 so there is no volatility in the interim (date 1) market value of the
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bank. Hence, even at date 0, the social planner can deﬁnitely induce interim solvency
with no uncertainty. To do so, period 1 prudential leverage L1 is set so to induce the
bank to choose high quality to boost date 1 bank value.
By contrast, under fair value accounting, X is reported at date 1 and the interim
market value of the bank is accordingly volatile, potentially triggering interim insol-
vency. Because at date 0 the exact value of X to be disclosed at date 1 cannot be
known, the social planner sets L1 to induce target incidence of interim insolvency,
which balances the trade-oﬀs described in Friction 2 and 3.
(iii) As a consequence of (i) and (ii), under historical cost accounting, the social
planner sets prudential leverages to induce a target incidence of asset substitution and
high quality. Under fair value accounting, prudential leverages are set so as to induce
the desired level of asset substitution and a target incidence of interim insolvency,
which may engender either high or low quality.
In particular, given fair value accounting, it is not surprising that with certain
parameter values, a combination of {a = 0, q = qH} that maximizes net cash ﬂow may
occur in equilibrium. More interestingly, however, with diﬀerent parameter values,
friction 3 above may take eﬀect: that is, eliminating asset substitution may endanger
the bank's investment in quality (i.e. a combination of {a = 0, q = qL}), or in the
other direction, tolerating asset substitution in order to increase bank's investment
in quality(i.e., a combination of {a = 1, q = qH}) may arise in equilibrium.
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5 HISTORICAL COST ACCOUNTING VERSUS FAIR VALUE AC-
COUNTING
Which accounting regime, historical cost or fair value, induces greater date 0 bank
value pi0? The answer lies along the dimensions of the parameters on the asset and
liability sides of bank balance sheets.
5.1 Asset Substitution Risk and Constraint
Proposition 6. (i) Under fair value accounting, when σZ is increasing from 0 or
when k is decreasing towards 0,
LFV2 is ﬁrst decreasing (L
FV
2 = γ0X) and later increasing (L
FV
2 = γ1X), and L
FV
1
is ﬁrst decreasing (from LFV1 = L1(γ0) to L
FV
1 = e
qL+SB0(γ0) ) and later increasing
(from LFV1 = e
qL+SB1(γ1) to L
FV
1 = L1(γ1)). Such a pattern of change induces a = 0
ﬁrst and a = 1 later, and induces qH ﬁrst, followed by qL, and eventually qH again.
(ii) Under historical cost accounting, when σZ is increasing from 0 or when k is
decreasing towards 0,
LHC2 and L
HC
1 are increasing, which induces q
HC = qH and an increasing Prob(a
HC =
1).
(iii) Historical cost accounting dominates fair value accounting for medium values
of σZ and k; Fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting for extremely
high or low values of σZ and k.
Greater asset substitution risk σZ or a looser asset substitution constraint k mo-
tivates the bank's asset substitution incentive. Therefore, what follows discusses the
intuition of Proposition 6 in terms of σZ , on the understanding that the same intuition
applies for k. The frictions introduced above feature strongly in Proposition 6.
Under fair value accounting, when asset substitution risk σZ is extremely low,
27
asset substitution is not so attractive to the bank in the ﬁrst place. Therefore, the
social planner can comfortably set high prudential leverage LFV2 to prevent asset
substitution without ever compromising the liquidity beneﬁt to depositors. The high
leverage in period 2 impeding asset substitution boosts the interim value of the bank,
allowing ample room for the social planner to set a high leverage LFV1 to induce high
loans quality and boost liquidity beneﬁts as well.
When asset substitution risk σZ is increasing, the bank's asset substitution incen-
tive is strengthening. Therefore, to curb this increasing incentive, the social planner
lowers the period 2 prudential leverage LFV2 . However, because of the trade-oﬀ de-
scribed in Friction 3, a dampened asset substitution incentive discourages investment
in quality. To restore high quality, the social planner lowers the period 1 pruden-
tial leverage LFV1 to reduce debt overhang. This induces no asset substitution and
high quality, but at the expense of lower liquidity beneﬁt implied by lower prudential
leverage. The date 0 value of the bank decreases.
When asset substitution risk σZ increases further, the disincentive to quality al-
luded to above becomes even stronger. Further decreasing leverage LFV1 to induce high
quality becomes too costly, so the social planner must tolerate low quality, which leads
to higher interim (date 1) insolvency risk. To curb this heightened risk, the social
planner lowers the period 1 prudential leverage L1 further. The low quality qL in
conjunction with low leverage further decreases the bank value at date 0.
When asset substitution risk σZ increases even more, lowering L2 further would
sacriﬁce too much liquidity beneﬁt. Therefore, the social planner raises L2 to impede
asset substitution. At the same time, higher L2 implies greater liquidity beneﬁts
and thus greater interim (date 1) bank value. Greater bank value at date 1 reduces
interim insolvency risk and thus allows ample room for the social planner to increase
the period 1 prudential leverage L1and thus enhance the period 1 liquidity beneﬁt.
For these reasons, bank value at date 0 reverses its downward slip and starts to
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increase.
When asset substitution risk σZ continues to increase further still, Friction 3
works to its fullest extent. An ever-increasing period 2 asset substitution incentive
eventually induces the bank to choose high quality in period 1, again giving the social
planner ample room to increase the period 1 prudential leverage L1 and thus enhance
the period 1 liquidity beneﬁt. Date 0 bank value increases even more.
Under historical cost accounting, because the interim loan performance X is not
disclosed, the social planner cannot eliminate asset substitution for certain because
period 2 prudential leverage L2 cannot be ﬁne-tuned to X. In other words, the social
planner has to allow for some probability of asset substitution. Therefore, the higher
the value of σZ , the greater the incentive for asset substitution, hence a high incidence
of asset substitution. To induce an optimal incidence of asset substitution, the higher
level of LHC2 will be set by the social planner. At the same time, a higher level of
L2 implies greater liquidity beneﬁt, thus higher interim (date 1) bank value. Greater
date 1 bank value reduces interim insolvency risk and thus gives the social planner
ample room to increase the period 1 prudential leverage L1 to enhance the period 1
liquidity beneﬁt. Date 0 bank value increases.
Which accounting regime, historical cost or fair value, induces a higher bank value
at date 0?
Proposition 6(iii) provides the answer: Historical cost accounting dominates for
mid-range values of asset substitution risk and constraint, and fair value accounting
dominates for extremely high or low values. The intuition hence hinges crucially on
Frictions 1, 2, and 3 and the fact that the prudential leverages L1 and L2 are optimally
coordinated by the social planner.
When asset substitution risk σZ is extremely low, curbing asset substitution by
setting high leverage L2 results in higher interim bank value and lower interim in-
solvency risk under fair value accounting than under historical cost accounting; the
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social planner can exploit this to raise L1 and thus enhance liquidity beneﬁts. So
the date 0 bank value under fair value accounting is higher than under historical cost
accounting.
By the same token, when asset substitution risk σZ is extremely high, tolerating
asset substitution by setting high leverage L2 results in greater interim bank value and
lower interim insolvency risk under fair value accounting than under historical cost
accounting. The social planner can exploit this to increase L1 to enhance liquidity
beneﬁt. Therefore, the date 0 bank value under fair value accounting is again higher
than under historical cost accounting.
For mid-range values of σZ , matters are dramatically diﬀerent. Hence, under
fair value accounting, because of the trade-oﬀ between asset substitution and quality
described in Friction 3, low quality is chosen in equilibrium, which works against the
relative desirability of fair value accounting, in that under historical cost accounting
the high quality is always chosen in equilibrium. Because the social planner tolerates
low quality in exchange for no asset substitution, a lower level of L2 is set than under
historical cost accounting, yielding a smaller liquidity beneﬁt for period 2 debtholders.
Because the two prudential leverages are coordinated, L1 also is lower under fair value
accounting. And there is an added beneﬁt of historical cost accounting: Because of the
absence of insolvency risk at date 1, so that high quality is chosen in equilibrium, the
social planner can further raise the period 1 leverage L1 to further enhance liquidity
beneﬁts. Therefore, date 0 bank value is higher under historical cost accounting than
under fair value accounting.
σZ captures the attractiveness or risk of asset substitution. I conjecture that σZ
diﬀers between bank assets of diﬀerent risk classes. For example, the bank has more
opportunity for asset substitution (constructing derivatives for speculation) for high
risk assets. In addition, I conjecture that σZ diﬀers for diﬀerent business cycle phases.
For example, the opportunity for asset substitution in a trough is relatively low and
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high at peak. Similarly, one can conjecture that k, asset substitution constraint diﬀers
for banks with diﬀering qualities of corporate governance, or under diﬀerent tightness
of stress test. Proposition 6 then has the following important policy implications.
(1) It may be socially beneﬁcial to impose prudential leverages contingent on the
risk classes (σZ) of bank assets and the strength (k) of bank's corporate governance.
Proposition 6 implies that the social planner may require historical cost accounting for
bank assets subject to medium asset substitution risk and/or for banks with medium
strength of corporate governance; fair value accounting is preferable however for the
least and the most risky bank assets and/or for banks with very weak or very strong
corporate governance.
(2) It may be socially beneﬁcial to make the choice of accounting methods contin-
gent on the phase of the business cycle. At troughs or peaks when asset substitution
risk is least or greatest, fair value accounting is called for; But during the expansion
or contraction phases of business cycle, historical cost accounting is preferable.
(3) Prudential regulations are contingent on the particular bank accounting method
in place. For medium values of asset substitution risk σZ and corporate governance
strength k, the social planner should set higher prudential leverages under the histor-
ical cost regime than under the fair value regime. However, for extremely low values
of σZ and high values of k, the social planner should set higher prudential leverages
under fair value regime. And for extremely high values of σZ and low values of k,
even though prudential regulations should set high leverages in both times, it should
be higher under fair value regime than under historical cost regime. In this regard,
fair value accounting may result in both counter-cyclical and pro-cyclical pruden-
tial regulation, while historical cost accounting may result in pro-cyclical prudential
regulation.
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5.2 Asset Speciﬁcity
Proposition 7. (i) Under fair value accounting, when α is increasing from 0, that
is, 1− α is decreasing from 1, then
LFV2 is ﬁrst constant(L
FV
2 = γ0X) and later increasing (L
FV
2 = γ1X), and L
FV
1
is ﬁrst constant(LFV1 = e
qL+SB0(γ0)) and later increasing(from L
FV
1 = e
qL+SB1(γ1)
to LFV1 = L1(γ1)). This pattern of change induces a = 0 ﬁrst and a = 1 later, and
induces qL ﬁrst and qH later.
(ii) Under historical cost accounting, when 1− α is decreasing from 1,then
LHC2 and L
HC
1 are increasing, which induces q
HC = qH and increasing Prob(a
HC =
1).
(iii) Historical cost accounting dominates fair value accounting for low values of
1 − α; fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting for high values of
1− α.
Because the liquidation value of loans at the terminal date (date 2) is αV where
α ∈ (0, 1), 1−α represents the deadweight loss per dollar of terminal cash ﬂow caused
by liquidation due to factors such as asset speciﬁcity.
When assets are not speciﬁc, deadweight loss is low (1 − α is low), and asset
speciﬁcity is not a big issue. In this case fair value accounting is inferior to historical
cost accounting for two reasons. First, as the deadweight loss due to liquidation is
small, ﬁne-tuning period 2 prudential leverage L2 to the interim performance report
X does not generate much beneﬁt. Second, however, fair value accounting triggers
interim insolvency risk at date 1, which hurts the chances of receiving the date 2 value.
This damage increases along with liquidation value (that is, when α is higher), while
under historical cost accounting, as information is not updated at date 1, interim
insolvency risk can be avoided. Both the beneﬁts of ﬁne-tuning leverage and of
avoiding interim insolvency risk enhance bank value. Therefore, the social planner
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will trade oﬀ between these two aspects for assets with diﬀerent asset speciﬁcity.
I conjecture that generic assets are normally less liquid at cyclical troughs or
contractions. Therefore, proposition 7 carries the following important policy implica-
tions.
(1) It may be socially beneﬁcial to impose prudential leverages contingent on the
speciﬁcity (1 − α) of bank assets. That is, social planners may require fair value
accounting for speciﬁc assets whose values are low in the secondary markets; But
historical cost accounting is preferable for generic assets whose values are relatively
high in the secondary markets.
(2) It may be socially beneﬁcial to make accounting methods contingent on the
phase of the business cycle. That is, at the trough or during a contraction character-
ized by relatively illiquid markets, fair value accounting is called for; But at the peak
or during the expansion, historical cost accounting is better.
These two implications contrast with Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008), who reach
the opposite conclusion in a diﬀerent setting in which banks make sell versus hold
decisions in Keynesian beauty contests.
5.3 Fundamental Risk
Proposition 8. Historical cost accounting dominates fair value accounting for lower
values of σX ; fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting for higher
values of σX .
When the fundamental risk does not exist (σX = 0), i.e., when the interim loan
performance X is known even at date 0, there is no diﬀerence between the two
accounting regimes as both regimes report the same information at date 1. When
σX is suﬃciently large, however, disclosure of the interim loan performance under
fair value accounting exposes the fundamental risk at date 1, which historical cost
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accounting does not permit. This is exactly the reason cited by fair value proponents.
In my model, the conventional wisdom that disclosure is beneﬁcial holds when the
volatility of fundamental performance is a signiﬁcant concern, because ﬁne-tuning
leverage to very volatile fundamental performance in this case is more valuable to
enhance bank value. When fundamental performance is less volatile, disclosure of
risk and thus ﬁne-tuning leverage to not volatile fundamental performance does not
generate too much beneﬁt, while fair value accounting can engenders volatility in
bank value and thus trigger interim insolvency, which historical cost accounting may
avoid. Therefore, depending on the conditions, the social planner will trade oﬀ these
two aspects in order to design the optimal regulations.
5.4 Quality Level and Quality Cost
Proposition 9. (i) Under fair value accounting, when qH is increasing from qL or
when c is decreasing towards 0,
LFV2 and L
FV
1 are increasing, which induces qL ﬁrst and qH later.
(ii) Under historical cost accounting, when qH is increasing from qL or when c is
decreasing towards 0,
LHC2 and L
HC
1 are increasing, which induces q
HC = qH and increasing Prob(a
HC =
1).
(iii) Historical cost accounting dominates fair value accounting for high values of
qH or low values of c; fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting for
low values of qH or high values of c.
Higher quality level qH , which approximately captures the marginal beneﬁts of
high quality or lower marginal cost c of investment in quality motivates banks' high
quality incentives. Therefore,the following focuses on the intuition of Proposition 9
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in terms of qH , with the understanding that the same intuition applies for c.
When qH is increasing from qL, the date 0 bank value naturally increases under
both accounting regimes. For high values of qH , the interim bank value will be high,
and interim (date 1) insolvency entails a substantial social loss. In this case, historical
cost accounting dominates because it avoids the interim insolvency. However, this
beneﬁt is small when the value of qH is low, in which case fair value accounting can
ﬁne-tune period 2 prudential leverage to the interim loan performance, enhancing
bank value. This constitutes the advantage of fair value accounting.
I conjecture that the marginal beneﬁt of high quality for heterogeneous loans is
greater than for homogeneous loans; The marginal cost for special types of loans is
higher than commonplace loans, and quality level is relatively higher in good times
than in bad times. Therefore, Proposition 9 yields the following policy implications.
(1) It may be socially beneﬁcial to mandate accounting regimes based on the char-
acteristics of bank loan applications. For loan applications of heterogeneous qualities
(high qH relative to qL), historical cost accounting is called for. For those of homoge-
neous quality (low qH relative to qL), fair value accounting is preferable. In addition,
for commonplace loan applications (low screening cost c), historical cost accounting
is called for, but for special types (high value of c), fair value accounting is better.
(2) It may be socially beneﬁcial to make the accounting method contingent on the
phase of the business cycle. To the extent that high quality and/or low marginal cost
of quality is featured in good times, and the converse is in bad times, Proposition
9 implies historical cost accounting in good times and fair value accounting in bad
times. This is exactly what impairment accounting prescribes. Göx and Wagenhofer
(2009) explain why impairment accounting may beneﬁt borrowers. Adding to this
literature, I explain why impairment accounting may also beneﬁt lenders (banks).
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5.5 Liquidity Beneﬁt
Proposition 10. (i) Under fair value accounting, when λ is increasing from 0, the
patterns of changes in LFV2 , L
FV
1 , a
FV , qFV , and piFV0 are the same as described in
Proposition 6 for an increasing value of σZ.
In particular, LFV2 and L
FV
1 are increasing in λ.
(ii) Under historical cost accounting, when λ is increasing,
LHC2 and L
HC
1 are increasing, which induces q
HC = qH and increasing Prob(a
HC =
1).
(iii) Historical cost accounting dominates fair value accounting for high values of
λ; fair value accounting dominates historical cost accounting for low values of λ.
The date 0 bank value pi0 has two components: the net present value of loan cash
ﬂows determined by the bank's quality q and asset substitution choice a, and the
liquidity beneﬁt to depositors determined by leverages L2 and L1.
When the liquidity beneﬁt λ is increasing, the social planner has stronger incentive
to increase leverage so as to enhance liquidity beneﬁts. Therefore, the social planner
naturally increases prudential leverages L2 and L1 under both accounting regimes.
For low values of λ, the liquidity beneﬁt is relatively smaller, so the social planner
focuses more on enhancing the net present value of loan cash ﬂow, in which case
fair value accounting is more attractive because the social planner can tie period
2 leverage to the interim performance report X, thus managing the bank's asset
substitution decision more eﬃciently to enhance net present value of loan cash ﬂow.
For high values of λ, the liquidity beneﬁt is greater so the social planner focuses more
on enhancing liquidity beneﬁt, making historical cost accounting more attractive in
that it avoids interim insolvency risk and so safeguards deposits and liquidity beneﬁt.
Therefore, for diﬀerent values of λ, the social planner will trade oﬀ these two aspects.
I conjecture that liquidity beneﬁt is more signiﬁcant in developing countries than in
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developed countries, and are valued diﬀerently in diﬀerent cyclical phases. Proposition
10 accordingly carries the following important policy implications.
(1) To the extent that liquidity beneﬁts are more signiﬁcant in developing countries
than in developed countries, social planners may require historical cost accounting
for developing countries. The International Financial Reporting Standards impose
fair value accounting, and more and more developing countries are in fact accepting
those standards. My result warns against blindly accepting fair value accounting for
banks in developing countries without a consideration of the liquidity beneﬁt to their
domestic depositors.
(2) It may be socially beneﬁcial to switch accounting methods contingent on the
phase of the business cycle. To the extent that liquidity beneﬁt is highly valued in
diﬃcult times, Proposition 10 implies that, at the peak or during expansion phase,
fair value accounting is called for; however, in the trough or during contraction phase,
historical cost accounting is preferable.
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6 CONCLUSIONS
This study focuses on the interaction between the bank's decisions (asset substitution
and quality of the loan portfolio) and the regulatory coordination (prudential regu-
lation and bank accounting). I identify several key parameters related to bank assets
and bank liabilities and investigate their eﬀects on bank and regulatory decisions,
and ultimately, on bank value. By incorporating both the asset and liability side of
bank's balance sheet, the model identiﬁes the conditions under which historical cost
accounting dominates fair value accounting, and the conditions for optimal prudential
regulation as described in the propositions.
The paper contributes to public policy-making in several ways. For example,
prudential regulation could be cycle-contingent. Fair value accounting is optimal
for peaks or troughs, historical cost accounting optimal for contraction or expan-
sion phases. In addition, the best accounting method may vary with the economic
circumstances. That is, historical cost accounting is better for good times and fair
value accounting is for bad times. Geographically, the model suggests that histori-
cal cost accounting is preferable for developing countries and fair value accounting is
preferable for developed countries.
My paper also contributes to banking theory. It explores the coordination of
prudential regulation with bank accounting in full accounting regimes, focusing on
the bank's decision on loan quality and asset substitution, while other papers study
diﬀerent decisions. I introduce many parameters to capture the characteristics of
bank loans and deposits, which should facilitate empirical testing of my theoretical
results.
The paper contrasts a pure fair value accounting regime with a pure historical
cost accounting regime. In practice, however, mixed-attributes accounting regimes
are applied. For example, impairment accounting combines some features of pure
historical cost accounting with some features of pure fair value accounting. That is,
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the two pure regimes can serve as benchmarks for future extension of the model to
mixed-attributes accounting regimes. This model takes the volume of bank lending
as given. Future research could endogenize lending decision to study how prudential
regulation of risk-based capital ratios under BASEL III should be designed in order
to maximize social value.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
If the bank chooses a = 1, it will be solvent at date 2 if and only if V ≥
L2 ⇔ Z = eσZη−k ≥ L2X , and the bank's expected date 2 payoﬀ in (1) will be
X
´∞
L2
X
(
Z − L2
X
)
f(Z)dZ. This payoﬀ equals Xe
1
2
σ2Z−k < 1 at L2
X
= 0 and approaches 0
when L2
X
approaches∞. Further, its derivative with respect to L2
X
is −X [1− F (L2
X
)]
.
If the bank chooses a = 0, it will be solvent at date 2 if and only if V ≥ L2 ⇔
1 ≥ L2
X
, and the bank's expected date 2 payoﬀ in (1) will be X
(
1− L2
X
)
if L2
X
≤ 1 and
0 otherwise. Its payoﬀ given solvency equals X at L2
X
= 0 and 0 when L2
X
= 1. Its
derivative with respect to L2
X
is −X.
Therefore, the bank's expected date 2 payoﬀ given a = 1 and that given a = 0
intersect at L2
X
= γ0, where γ0 is deﬁned by 1 − γ0 =
´∞
γ0
(Z − γ0) f(Z)dZ. And the
bank will choose asset substitution (a = 1) over no asset substitution if and only if
the leverage is high enough (L2 > γ0X).
By (3), if X were known to the capital market, the bank's market value of equity
at date 1 given a = 0 is X
(
1− L2
X
)
and its market value of debt at date 1 given a = 0
is X L2
X
(1 + λ), which sum to XB0
(
L2
X
)
, where B0
(
L2
X
) ≡ 1 + L2
X
λ.
Similarly, by (3), if X were known to the capital market, the bank's market value
of equity at date 1 given a = 1 is X
´∞
L2
X
(
Z − L2
X
)
f(Z)dZ and the bank's market value
of debt at date 1 given a = 1 is X
[´∞
L2
X
L2
X
(1 + λ)f(Z)dZ +
´ L2
X
0
αZ(1 + λ)f(Z)dZ
]
,
which sum up to XB1
(
L2
X
)
, where
B1
(
L2
X
)
≡
∞ˆ
L2
X
(
Z +
L2
X
λ
)
f(Z)dZ +
L2
Xˆ
0
αZ(1 + λ)f(Z)dZ.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Note that pi1(q, L2) is increasing in q, hence pi1(qL, L2) < pi1(qH , L2). Thus, there
are three cases to discuss:
(i) When L1 ≤ pi1(qL, L2), the bank's expected payoﬀ in (6) is −c+pi1(qH , L2)−L1
given qH and pi1(qL, L2)−L1 given qL. Because pi1(qH , L2)− pi1(qL, L2) > c, the bank
will choose qH .
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(ii) When L1 ∈ (pi1(qL, L2), pi1(qH , L2)], the bank's expected payoﬀ in (6) is
−c+ pi1(qH , L2)− L1
given qH and 0 given qL, hence, the bank will choose qH if and only if L1 ≤ pi1(qH , L2)−
c.
(iii) When L1 > pi1(qH , L2), the bank's expected payoﬀ in (6) is −c given qH and
0 given qL so the bank will choose qL.
To summarize, the bank will choose qH if and only if L1 ≤ pi1(qH , L2)− c.
Deﬁne pi0 ≡ D0+E0 as the ex ante bank value. When L1 > pi1(qH , L2)−c, E0 = 0
by (6) and D0 = 0 by (7), hence pi0 ≡ D0 +E0 = 0. When L1 ≤ pi1(qH , L2)− c, E0 =
−c+pi1(qH , L2)−L1 by (6) andD0 = L1(1+λ) by (7), hence pi0 = −c+pi1(qH , L2)+L1λ.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The social planner sets {L1, L2} to maximize the date 0 bank value pi0 ≡ D0 +E0,
which is pi0 = −c+pi1(qH , L2)+L1λ when L1 ≤ pi1(qH , L2)− c, as stated at the end of
the proof of Proposition 2. Thus, in this case, the optimal value of L1 is pi1(qH , L2)−c,
Therefore pi0 = [pi1(qH , L2)− c](1 + λ), which is greater than 0, which is the value of
pi0 when L1 > pi1(qH , L2)− c. Hence, qHC = qH .
Therefore, the optimal value of L2 is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
pi0 = [pi1(qH , L2)− c](1 + λ)
with respect to L2, which is given in (8) in the statement of the proposition. As
a consequence, Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
, LHC1 = pi1(qH , L
HC
2 ) − c, and piHC =
[pi1(qH , L
HC
2 )− c](1 + λ). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
By (9), ∂E0
∂L1
= −Ba(γ)[1 − Φ
(
(ln L1
Ba(γ)
− q)/σX
)
] < 0, which implies that the
slope of E0 given qH is steeper than that given qL. Moreover, at L1 = 0, E0 given qH
equals Ba(γ)E[X|qH ]− c and E0 given qL equals Ba(γ)E[X|qL]; The former is greater
than the latter by the assumption that E[X|qH ] − E[X|qL] > c and by the fact that
Ba(γ) ≥ 1. Furthermore, when L1 → ∞, E0 given qH approaches −c and E0 given
qL approaches 0. Thus, E0 given qH exceeds E0 given qL if and only if L1 ≤ L1 where
L1 is the value of L1 where the two equity values are equal and are characterized in
(11) in the statement of the proposition.
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Thus, when L ≤ L1, the bank will choose qH , and by (9), its date 0 equity value
will be
−c+
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
[XBa(γ)− L1] g(X; qH)dX
by (10), its date 0 debt value will be
D0 =
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
L1(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX
and therefore the date 0 bank value is
pi0(L1, qH) = −c+
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
[XBa(γ) + L1λ] g(X; qH)dX.
Similarly, when L > L1, the bank will choose qL, and by (9) its date 0 equity value
will be
´∞
L1
Ba(γ)
[XBa(γ)− L1] g(X; qL)dX and by (10), its date 0 debt value will be
D0 =
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
L1(1 + λ)g(X; qL)dX
and therefore the date 0 bank value is
pi0(L1, qL) =
ˆ ∞
L1
Ba(γ)
[XBa(γ) + L1λ] g(X; qL)dX.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Recall from the proof of Proposition 4 that when L ≤ L1, the date 0 bank value is
pi0(L1, qH) = −c+Ba(γ)A
(
L1
Ba(γ)
, qH
)
whereA
(
L1
Ba(γ)
, q
)
≡ ´∞L1
Ba(γ)
[
X + L1
Ba(γ)
λ
]
g(X; q)dX.
Because ∂pi0(L1,qH)
∂Ba(γ)
= A− ∂A
∂( L1Ba(γ))
L1
Ba(γ)
> 0, the social planner will set the value of
L2
X
= γ to maximize Ba(γ). By (4), B0
(
L2
X
)
attains its maximum value at L2
X
= γ0
and B1
(
L1
X
)
attains its maximum value at L2
X
= γ1 where γ1 = e
T−k where T is
characterized by h(T/σZ)/σZ =
λ
(1+λ)(1−α) . Thus, the social planner will set
L2
X
= γ0
if B0(γ0) ≥ B1(γ1) and L2X = γ1 if B1(γ1) > B0(γ0).
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In addition,
∂pi0(L1,qH)
∂L1
= ∂A
∂( L1Ba(γ))
=
[1− Φ
(
(ln L1
Ba(γ)
− q)/σX
)
][λ− (1 + λ)h
(
(ln L1
Ba(γ)
− q)/σX
)
/σX ].
(15)
Note that at L1
Ba(γ)
= 0, A = E[X|qH ] and when L1Ba(γ) → ∞, A approaches
0. Further, it reaches its maximum value at L1
Ba(γ)
= eq+S where S is deﬁned by
h(S/σX)/σX =
λ
1+λ
. Moreover, it is concave for lower values of L1
Ba(γ)
and convex for
higher values of L1
Ba(γ)
. Therefore, A− ∂A
∂( L1Ba(γ))
L1
Ba(γ)
> 0.
Again from the proof of Proposition 4, when L > L1, the date 0 bank value is
pi0(L1, qL) = Ba(γ)A
(
L1
Ba(γ)
, qL
)
. A similar analysis again generates the same decision
rule for L2.
Recall from the above that by (15), pi0(L1, q) attains its maximum value at
L1
Ba(γ)
= eq+S. When L1
Ba(γ)
> eqL+S, however, this ideal value is not attainable for
a social planner who wants to induce qL, and so must set L1 = L1, which violates
the assumption that when bank is indiﬀerent between qH and qL, it will choose qH .
Thus, it must be the case that L1
Ba(γ)
≤ eqL+S, which implies the following:
(i) If the aim is to induce qL, the social planner sets L1 = e
qL+SBa(γ) and thus
pi0(e
qL+S, qL) = Ba(γ)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
.
(ii) If the aim is to induce qH , the social planner sets L1 = L1(γ) because L1 =
eqH+SBa(γ) is not feasible and thus pi0(
L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
, qH) = −c+Ba(γ)A
(
L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
, qH
)
. Overall,
the above results imply that the social planner will induce qH if and only if
A
(
L1(γ)
Ba(γ)
, qH
)
− A (eqL+S, qL) ≥ c
Ba(γ)
.

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Fair Value Accounting:
By (2), ∂γ0
∂σZ
< 0. By (13), ∂B0(γ0)
∂σZ
< 0. Conversely, by (14), ∂γ1
∂σZ
> 0. By (13),
∂B1(γ1)
∂σZ
> 0. Therefore, B0(γ0) > B1(γ1) for lower values of σZ and vice versa for high
values.
Then, for lower values of σZ , the social planner will set L2 = γ0X to induce B0(γ0).
In these cases, a higher value of σZ will lead to a lower value of B0(γ0), which in turn
43
will lead to a lower value of L1(γ0) by (11). Furthermore, a lower value of L1(γ0) will
lead to a lower value of the left-hand side of (12), which implies that it will become
less beneﬁcial for the planner to induce qH .
By similar reasoning, for higher values of σZ , the social planner will set L2 = γ1X
to induce B1(γ1). In these cases, a higher value of σZ will lead to a higher value of
B1(γ1), which in turn will lead to a higher value of L1(γ1) by (11). Furthermore, a
higher value of L1(γ1) will lead to a higher value of the left-hand side of (12), which
implies that it will become more beneﬁcial for the planner to induce qH .
The foregoing results imply that when σZ is increasing from 0, L
FV
2 is ﬁrst de-
creasing (LFV2 = γ0X) and later increasing (L
FV
2 = γ1X). Such a pattern induces
a = 0 ﬁrst and a = 1 later.
By Proposition 5, when σZ is increasing from 0, L
FV
1 is ﬁrst decreasing (from
LFV1 = L1(γ0) to L
FV
1 = e
qL+SB0(γ0)) and later increasing (from L
FV
1 = e
qL+SB1(γ1)
to LFV1 = L1(γ1)). Such a pattern induces qH ﬁrst, later qL, and eventually qH later
still.
By the foregoing results and by Proposition 5, when σZ is increasing from 0,
the equilibrium date 0 bank value changes from piFV0 = B0(γ0)A
(
L1(γ0)
B0(γ0)
, qH
)
− c to
piFV0 = B0(γ0)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
, then to piFV0 = B1(γ1)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
, and eventually to
piFV0 = B1(γ1)A
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
, qH
)
− c.
Historical Cost Accounting:
By (8),
∂LHC2
∂σZ
> 0. And because ∂γ0
∂σZ
< 0, Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
is increasing
in σZ .
By (5),
∂pi1(LHC2 ,qH)
∂σZ
> 0 and therefore
∂LHC1
∂σZ
> 0 and
∂piHC0
∂σZ
> 0.
Comparison of Fair Value Accounting and Historical Cost Accounting:
First show that when σZ is suﬃciently large, pi
FV
0 > pi
HC
0 .
Note that
∂piHC0
∂σZ
=
´ LHC2
γ0
0 X
∂B1
(
LHC2
X
)
∂σZ
g(X; qH)dX by the expression for pi
HC
0 in
Proposition 3. Note that when σZ →∞, LHC2 →∞ and γ0 → 0, and thus
∂piHC0
∂σZ
→
ˆ ∞
0
X
∂B1
(
LHC2
X
)
∂σZ
g(X; qH)dX.
Next note that when σZ is suﬃciently large, pi
FV
0 = B1(γ1)A
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
, qH
)
− c
according to Proposition 5. Therefore,
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∂piFV0
∂σZ
= (1 + λ)
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
)2
g
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
)
∂B1(γ1)
∂σZ
+
´∞
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
X ∂B1(γ1)
∂σZ
g(X; qH)dX
+∂L1(γ1)
∂σZ
[
1−G
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
)] [
λ− (1 + λ)h
((
lnL1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
− qH
)
/σX
)
/σX
]
.
(16)
Note that when σZ →∞, γ1 →∞ and B1 (γ1)→∞, and thus
∂piFV0
∂σZ
→ (1 + λ)
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
)2
g
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
)
∂B1(γ1)
∂σZ
+
´∞
0
X ∂B1(γ1)
∂σZ
g(X; qH)dX
+∂L1(γ1)
∂σZ
[
1−G
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
)] [
λ− (1 + λ)h
((
lnL1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
− qH
)
/σX
)
/σX
]
.
(17)
Because the second and third terms of the preceding expression are both positive
and because the ﬁrst term equals
∂piHC0
∂σZ
in the limit, when σZ → ∞, ∂pi
FV
0
∂σZ
>
∂piHC0
∂σZ
.
Because when σZ → ∞, both piFV0 and piHC0 go to ∞ and ∂pi
FV
0
∂σZ
>
∂piHC0
∂σZ
, it must be
the case that when σZ is suﬃciently large, pi
FV
0 > pi
HC
0 .
Next show that when σZ is suﬃciently low, pi
FV
0 > pi
HC
0 where
piFV0 = B0(γ0)A
(
L1(γ0)
B0(γ0)
, qH
)
− c
according to Proposition 5.
Note that when σZ → 0, LHC2 → 0 and γ0 → 1, and thus pi1 → E[X|qH ].
Thus, when σZ → 0, piHC0 → (1 + λ)E[X|qH ] − (1 + λ)c. Moreover, when σZ →
0, γ0 → 1 and thus B0(γ0) → 1 + λ, which in turn implies that piFV0 → (1 +
λ)
´∞
L1(γ0)
1+λ
[
X + L1(γ0)
1+λ
λ
]
g(X; qH)dX − c. Because
´∞
y
[X + yλ] g(X; qH)dX is increas-
ing in y for y < eqH+S, it must be the case that when σZ is suﬃciently low, pi
FV
0 > pi
HC
0 .
Overall, because piFV0 is a U-shaped curve of σZ and pi
HC
0 is an increasing function
of σZ , and because pi
FV
0 > pi
HC
0 for both extremely low values and extremely high
values of σZ , it must be the case that pi
HC
0 > pi
FV
0 for medium values of σZ and the
converse is true for extreme values of σZ .
The proof of the results regarding k follows the same reasoning as above and can
accordingly be omitted. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
Fair Value Accounting:
By (2), ∂γ0
∂α
= 0. By (13), ∂B0(γ0)
∂α
= 0. In contrast, by (14), ∂γ1
∂α
> 0. By (13),
∂B1(γ1)
∂α
> 0. Therefore, B0(γ0) > B1(γ1) for lower values of α and vice versa.
Hence, for lower values of α, the social planner will set L2 = γ0X to induce B0(γ0),
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and for higher values of σZ will set L2 = γ1X to induce B1(γ1). In the latter case,
a higher value of α will lead to a higher value of B1(γ1), which in turn will lead to
a higher value of L1(γ1) by (11). Furthermore, a higher value of L1(γ1) will lead to
a higher value of the left-hand side of (12), which implies that it will become more
beneﬁcial for the planner to induce qH .
The foregoing results imply that when α is increasing from 0, LFV2 is constant ﬁrst
(LFV2 = γ0X) and increasing later (L
FV
2 = γ1X). Such a pattern induces a = 0 ﬁrst
and a = 1 later.
By Proposition 5, when α is increasing from 0, LFV1 is constant ﬁrst (L
FV
1 =
eqL+SB0(γ0)) and increasing later (from L
FV
1 = e
qL+SB1(γ1) to L
FV
1 = L1(γ1)). Such
a pattern induces qL ﬁrst and qH later.
By the foregoing results and by Proposition 5, when α is increasing from 0, the
equilibrium date 0 bank value changes from piFV0 = B0(γ0)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
to piFV0 =
B1(γ1)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
, and eventually to piFV0 = B1(γ1)A
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
, qH
)
− c.
Historical Cost Accounting:
By (8),
∂LHC2
∂α
> 0 and therefore Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
is increasing in α.
By (5),
∂pi1(LHC2 ,qH)
∂α
> 0 and therefore
∂LHC1
∂α
> 0 and
∂piHC0
∂α
> 0.
Comparison of Fair Value Accounting and Historical Cost Accounting:
First show that when α is suﬃciently large, piHC0 > pi
FV
0 .
Note that when α = 1, B′1
(
LHC2
X
)
> 0 and thus LHC2 → ∞, which implies that
B1
(
LHC2
X
)
= E[Z](1+λ) and pi1 = E[X|qH ]E[Z](1+λ). Thus, piHC0 = E[X|qH ]E[Z](1+
λ)2 − c(1 + λ).
Next note that when α = 1, piFV0 = B1(γ1)A
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
, qH
)
− c according to Propo-
sition 5. Because γ1 →∞ and B1 (γ1)→ E[Z](1 + λ) when α = 1,
piFV0 →
ˆ ∞
L1(γ0)
E[Z](1+λ)
[
XE[Z](1 + λ) + L1(γ1)λ
]
g(X; qH)dX − c.
By (11), piHC0 > pi
FV
0 if and only if
E[X|qH ]E[Z](1 + λ)2 >´∞
L1(γ0)
E[Z](1+λ)
XE[Z](1 + λ)2g(X; qH)dX − λE[Z](1 + λ)
´∞
L1(γ0)
E[Z](1+λ)
[
X − L1(γ0)E[Z](1+λ)
]
g(X; qL)dX,
which always holds.
Similar reasoning demonstrates that when α is suﬃciently low, piFV0 > pi
HC
0 due
to (i) B0(γ0) > B1(γ1) and (ii) c is suﬃciently high.
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Overall, both piFV0 and pi
HC
0 are increasing functions of α and in particular pi
HC
0
is linear in α. In addition, because piFV0 > pi
HC
0 when α = 0 and pi
HC
0 > pi
FV
0 when
α = 1, it must be the case that piHC0 > pi
FV
0 for large values of α and vice versa. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8
Fair Value Accounting:
By Proposition 5, it is straightforward to show that piFV0 = Ba(γa)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
or piFV0 = Ba(γa)A
(
L1(γa)
Ba(γa)
, qH
)
− c is increasing in σX .
Historical Cost Accounting:
For log normal distributions, density is decreasing in σX for X ∈ (eq−σX , eq+σX )
and increasing in σX otherwise. Therefore,
∂pi1(LHC2 ,qH)
∂σX
> 0 for lower values of σX and
∂pi1(LHC2 ,qH)
∂σX
< 0 for higher values of σX . Thus, pi
HC
0 follows the same pattern.
Comparison of Fair Value Accounting and Historical Cost Accounting:
At σX = 0, pi
HC
0 = pi
FV
0 . Because pi
FV
0 is increasing in σX and pi
HC
0 is increasing
for lower values of σX and decreasing for higher values of σX , pi
HC
0 > pi
FV
0 for lower
values of σX and vice versa. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Fair Value Accounting:
A higher value of qH will lead to a higher value of the left-hand side of (12), which
implies that it will become more beneﬁcial for the planner to induce qH .
By Proposition 5, when qH is increasing from qL, L
FV
1 is constant ﬁrst (L
FV
1 =
eqL+SBa(γa)) and increasing later (L
FV
1 = L1(γa)). Such a pattern induces qL ﬁrst
and qH later.
By the foregoing results and by Proposition 5, when qH is increasing from qL,
the equilibrium date 0 bank value is constant ﬁrst (piFV0 = Ba(γa)A
(
eqL+S, qL
)
) and
increasing later (piFV0 = Ba(γa)A
(
L1(γa)
Ba(γa)
, qH
)
− c).
Historical Cost Accounting:
By (8),
∂LHC2
∂qH
> 0 and therefore Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
is increasing in qH .
By (5),
∂pi1(LHC2 ,qH)
∂qH
> 0 and therefore
∂LHC1
∂qH
> 0 and
∂piHC0
∂qH
> 0.
Comparison of Fair Value Accounting and Historical Cost Accounting:
First show that when qH is suﬃciently large, pi
HC
0 > pi
FV
0 where
piFV0 = B1(γ1)A
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
, qH
)
− c
according to Proposition 5.
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By (11), piHC0 > pi
FV
0 if and only if
´∞
L2
γ0
XB0
(
L2
X
)
(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX +
´ L2
γ0
0 XB1
(
L2
X
)
(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX >´∞
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
XB1(γ1)(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX − λB1(γ1)
´∞
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
[
X − L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
]
g(X; qL)dX.
(18)
The preceding inequality holds for suﬃciently large values of qH , because as qH →∞,
LHC2 →∞ and L1(γa)→∞.
Similar reasoning demonstrates that when qH = qL, pi
FV
0 > pi
HC
0 .
Thus, it must be the case that piHC0 > pi
FV
0 for large values of qH and vice versa.
The proof of the results regarding c follows the same reasoning and can accordingly
be omitted. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10
Fair Value Accounting:
By (13), B0(γ0) = 1 at λ = 0 and is linearly increasing in λ. By (13), B1(γ1) =
E[Z] < 1 at λ = 0 and is increasing and convex in λ. Therefore, B0(γ0) > B1(γ1) for
lower values of λ and vice versa.
Thus, for lower values of λ, the social planner will set L2 = γ0X to induce B0(γ0),
and for higher values of λ will set L2 = γ1X to induce B1(γ1). In the latter case, a
higher value of λ will lead to a lower value of the left-hand side of (12), which implies
that it will become less beneﬁcial for the planner to induce qH .
The foregoing results imply that when λ is increasing from 0, the patterns of
changes in LFV2 , L
FV
1 , a
FV , qFV , and piFV0 follow trend described in Proposition 6 for
an increasing value of σZ .
Historical Cost Accounting:
By (8),
∂LHC2
∂λ
> 0 and therefore Prob(aHC = 1) = G
(
LHC2
γ0
)
is increasing in λ.
By (5),
∂pi1(LHC2 ,qH)
∂λ
> 0 and therefore
∂LHC1
∂λ
> 0 and
∂piHC0
∂λ
> 0.
Comparison of Fair Value Accounting and Historical Cost Accounting:
First show that when λ is suﬃciently large, piHC0 > pi
FV
0 , where
piFV0 = B1(γ1)A
(
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
, qH
)
− c
according to Proposition 5.
48
By (11), piHC0 > pi
FV
0 if and only if
´∞
L2
γ0
XB0
(
L2
X
)
(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX +
´ L2
γ0
0 XB1
(
L2
X
)
(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX >´∞
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
XB1(γ1)(1 + λ)g(X; qH)dX − λB1(γ1)
´∞
L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
[
X − L1(γ1)
B1(γ1)
]
g(X; qL)dX,
(19)
which holds for suﬃciently large values of λ.
Similar reasoning demonstrates that when λ = 0,
piFV0 = pi
HC
0 = E[X|qH ]− c
and
∂piFV0
∂λ
>
∂piHC0
∂λ
because qH is suﬃciently high.
Overall, both piFV0 and pi
HC
0 are increasing functions of λ. Moreover, when λ = 0,
piFV0 = pi
HC
0 and
∂piFV0
∂λ
>
∂piHC0
∂λ
. Furthermore, when λ is suﬃciently large, piHC0 > pi
FV
0 .
Thus, it must be the case that piHC0 > pi
FV
0 for large values of λ and vice versa. 
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